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Third-party funding is no longer a new phenomenon, but rather is a 
mainstay in global commerce and dispute resolution.1 This article introduces the 
question of whether third-party litigation funding2 should fall within the purview 
of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.3  Third-
party litigation funding involves a third-party entity as the financier of the legal 
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1 See, e.g., Vanessa O’Connell, Funds Spring Up to Invest in High-Stakes Litigation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 
2011. (“The new breed of profit-seeker sees a huge, untapped market for betting on high-stakes 
commercial claims. After all, companies will spend about $15.5 billion this year on U.S. 
commercial litigation and an additional $2.6 billion on intellectual-property litigation, according to 
estimates by BTI Consulting Group Inc., a Wellesley, Mass., research firm that surveyed 300 large 
companies in 2011.”); Jennifer Smith, Litigation Investors Gain Ground in U.S., WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 
2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303819704579316621131535960 
(discussing that several litigation funders have several hundreds of millions of dollars in assets 
under management); Jennifer Smith, Investors Put Up Millions of Dollars to Fund Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 7, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323820304578408794155816934 
(“…Gerchen Keller Capital LLC, a Chicago-based team that includes former lawyers … has raised 
more than $100 million and says there is plenty of room for newcomers given the size of the U.S. 
litigation market, which they put at more than $200 billion, measuring the money spent by 
plaintiffs and defendants on litigation.”); Press Release, Excend, Excend Engaged as Advisory [sic] 
for Multi-Billion Dollar Judgment Litigation Funding (May 1, 2012), 
http://www.excend.com/press/2012-05-09-Excend-Engaged-as-Advisor-for-Multi-Billion-
Dollar-Judgment-Litigation-Funding.pdf. 
2 Some scholars use the term “third-party funding” or “litigation funding” to refer to this same 
phenomenon. 
3 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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representation of a party in a case as an alternative to the party self-funding the 
legal representation or receiving attorney financing through a contingent or 
conditional fee agreement.4  If the funded party is the plaintiff, then the third-
party entity contracts to receive a percentage or fraction of the proceeds from the 
case, if the plaintiff wins.5  If the funded party is the defendant, then the third-
party entity contracts to receive a predetermined payment from the defendant, 
similar to an insurance premium.6  In addition, depending on the structure of the 
agreement, the funder may legally control or influence aspects of the legal 
representation or may completely take over the case and step into the shoes of 
the original party.7   
Generally, regulation of litigation funding has been rather light in the 
three major litigation-funding jurisdictions — the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Australia.8  Both Australia and the United Kingdom have 
investigated or addressed litigation funding at the federal level.9  Australia has 
addressed litigation funding through opinions of its High Court (the equivalent to 
                                                
4 There are other types of third-party funding, such as lawyer lending, assignment, or insurance 
covering legal expenses.  This paper limits its discussion, however, to third-party funding 
arrangements with the following three characteristics:  (1) the funder contracts directly with the 
original party to the case, (2) the original party remains a party to the case, and (3) the funder does 
not become a party in the case.   
5 See LISA BENCH NIEUWVELD & VICTORIA SHANNON, THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 4-11 (2012) (describing the players in third-party funding, the 
types of funding relationships, and the effect of the type of funder on the attorney-client 
relationship).    
6 Id. 
7 Assignment of the claim or an insurance arrangement are two structures in which the funder 
may legally control or influence the case, perhaps even becoming a party to the dispute.  For an 
in-depth treatment of assignment and insurance policies in the third-party litigation funding 
context, see, e.g., Paul Bond, Making Champerty Work: An Invitation to State Action, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
1297 (2002); Terrence Cain, Fringe Economy Lending- The Problem, its Demographics, and Proposals for 
Change: Third Party Funding of Personal Injury Tort Claims: Keep the Baby and Change the Bathwater, 89 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 11 (2014); Anthony J. Sebok, Betting on Tort Suits After the Event:  From 
Champerty to Insurance, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 453 (2011); Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury 
Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329 (1987).   
8 See generally Nicholas Mavrakis, Ross McInnes & Michael Legg, Litigation funding now (lightly) 
regulated, CLAYTON UTZ INSIGHTS, Jul. 19 2012, 
http://www.claytonutz.com/publications/edition/19_july_2012/20120719/litigation_funding_n
ow_lightly_regulated.page (discussing the light regulation of litigation funding in Australia); 
Nieuwveld & Shannon, supra note 5, at 144-59 (discussing the patchwork of state regulation and 
non-regulation of litigation funding in the United States); Victoria Shannon, Recent Developments in 
Third-Party Funding, 30 J. INT’L ARB. 443, 446-48 (2013) (discussing the voluntary code of 
conduct for litigation funders in the UK and how the Jackson Reforms have affected litigation 
funding). 
9 See infra notes 10-14. 
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the United States Supreme Court), opinions of various state courts, and regulatory 
guidance from the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 
(equivalent to the Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States).10  
The United Kingdom commissioned a litigation costs study in 2009 headed by 
Lord Justice Jackson of the Court of Appeal that examined litigation funding, 
among other mechanisms for managing costs.11  In April 2013, the Jackson 
Reforms, derived from the costs study, paved the way for expanded litigation 
funding, among other reforms for managing litigation costs.12  In addition, 
funders in the UK have organized themselves under a voluntary Code of 
Conduct, and the Ministry of Justice’s Civil Justice Council has established the 
Association of Litigation Funders, a regulatory body responsible for litigation 
funding and ensuring compliance with the Code of Conduct.13  According to its 
website, “[t]he Association of Litigation Funders (the ALF) is an independent 
body that has been charged by the Ministry of Justice, through the Civil Justice 
Council, with delivering self-regulation of litigation funding in England and 
Wales.”14 
Outside of the ALF, some third-party funders have chosen to self-
regulate on their own.  For example, Juridica, a publicly-traded funder based in 
the United Kingdom, engages in an internal compliance and ethics review process 
before making an investment to ensure that the litigation funding agreement 
complies with the applicable rules.15  Harbour Litigation Funding LTD, a private 
funder in the United Kingdom, has a CFO who is also the Compliance Officer 
for the company.16  Bentham IMF in the United States has recently adopted a 
                                                
10 See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 5 at 78-89 (discussing the laws on litigation funding in 
Australia). 
11 See Shannon, Recent Developments, supra note 8, at 447-48. 
12 Id. 
13 See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 5, at 114, 245-47 (discussing code of conduct and 
reproducing code of conduct in Appendix of book); Shannon, Recent Developments, supra note 8, at 
447-48. 
14 About Us, ASSOCIATION OF LITIGATION FUNDERS, 
http://associationoflitigationfunders.com/about-us/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2014). 
15 See Jennifer Banzaca, In Turbulent Markets, Hedge Fund Managers Turn to Litigation Funding for 
Absolute, Uncorrelated Returns, 2 THE HEDGE FUND LAW REPORT, no. 25, June 24, 2009, 
http://www.juriscapitalcorp.com/images/Hedge%20Fund%20Law%20Report%20Article.pdf. 
16 See Ben Mawela (Individual Profiles), HARBOUR LITIGATION FUNDING LTD, 
http://www.harbourlitigationfunding.com/individual-profiles/ben-mawela (last visited Oct. 11, 
2014). 
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voluntary Code of Best Practices, similar to the Code of Conduct in the UK.17  
Still, there is no requirement that funders self-regulate and no designated external 
regulatory body overseeing the activities of litigation funders.   
Unlike Australia and the United Kingdom, the United States has a 
confusing state-by-state patchwork of laws on third-party litigation funding and 
no federal guidance whatsoever.18  Seven states have passed legislation allowing or 
restricting litigation funding, while twelve states have proposed regulation or 
pending regulation.19  Most of the other states either have spotty case law or bar 
ethics opinions that discuss litigation funding or have no jurisprudence at all 
about litigation funding.20  As the industry grows, this disjointed regime will create 
confusion in the marketplace regarding which state’s rules apply to any given 
litigation funding transaction. 
Worldwide, three litigation funders are publicly traded — IMF in 
Australia, Burford Group21 and Juridica in the United Kingdom.  These three 
publicly traded funders are subject to the financial regulations of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC),22 the Financial Services Authority (FSA),23 and 
                                                
17 See Litigation Funder Bentham IMF Adopts Code of Best Practices for US, BENTHAM IMF, 
http://www.benthamimf.com/docs/default-source/default-document-library/bentham-press-
release-for-code-of-best-practices.pdf?sfvrsn=2.  
18 See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 5, at 144-59 (discussing a 51-jurisdiction survey of the 
patchwork of laws on third-party litigation funding in the United States as of early 2012); see also 
infra note 19. 
19 See generally Heather Morton, Litigation or Lawsuit Funding Transactions 2014 Legislation, NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jun. 4, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-
services-and-commerce/litigation-funding-transactions-2014-legislation.aspx (listing proposed and 
passed legislation state by state); Richard A. Blunk, Have the States Properly Addressed the Evils of 
Consumer Litigation Finance?, A MODEL LITIGATION FINANCE CONTRACT (Jan. 21, 2014), 
http://litigationfinancecontract.com/have-the-states-properly-addressed-the-evils-of-consumer-
litigation-finance/ (describing the litigation funding statutes in Maine, Ohio, Nebraska and 
Oklahoma).  As of June 2014, the states that have passed legislation either allowing or prohibiting 
consumer litigation funding are Maine, Indiana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Nebraska, New York (allowed 
for large commercial disputes), and Tennessee.  The states that have proposed legislation in this 
area are Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana (other bills proposed), Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Missouri, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Vermont.  Other states either have 
case law or attorney ethics opinions.  See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 5, at 144-59 (51 
jurisdiction survey of existing state laws as of early 2012). 
20 See supra notes 18-19. 
21 Although Burford is a US-based funder, it decided to go public on the UK stock exchange. 
22 The SEC is located in the United States.  See U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2014). 
23 The FSA is located in the United Kingdom.  See FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2014).  
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the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC).24  Yet, there are 
dozens of other private litigation funders that are subject to little or no financial 
regulation at all.   
Most third-party funders that fund commercial litigation are private hedge 
funds.25  Dodd-Frank provisions aimed at hedge funds have not directly 
addressed the litigation funding industry.26  Some scholars fear that funders will 
securitize their investments in litigation and sell derivative interests in lawsuits to 
spread the risk of funding among numerous investors.27  Asset-backed securities 
fall under Dodd-Frank.28  Does a contractual agreement to pay the legal fees and 
costs for a litigant qualify as an asset?  If so, then bundling and selling litigation 
finance contracts may constitute asset-backed securities that would be subject to 
regulation under the Dodd-Frank Act and the general securities laws.29  Prior to 
the bundling, the underlying transaction is largely unregulated.30  If securitizing 
unregulated litigation funding contracts could lead to problems regarding the 
valuation and stability of the bundled securities, then litigation funding contracts 
themselves might warrant regulation under the Dodd-Frank Act or other 
securities laws. 
                                                
24 The ASIC is located in Australia.  See AUSTRALIAN SEC. AND INVESTMENTS COMM’N, 
http://www.asic.gov.au/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2014). 
25 The predominant view among academics, attorneys, funders and regulators is that the litigation 
funding market is split into consumer funding (typically involving an individual person as the 
funded party in the case) and commercial funding (business-to-business disputes).  Generally, a 
funder invests in either commercial or consumer cases, but not both. 
26 Hedge funds (including litigation funders, whether domestic or foreign) with $100 million or 
more in assets under management must register with the SEC, but there are no specific 
regulations aimed at the litigation funding industry.  See U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, About 
Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations: National Exam Program: Offices and Program Areas, 
http://www.sec.gov/ocie/Article/about.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2014) ("For the most part, IAs 
[Investment Advisors] who manage $100 million or more in client assets must register with the 
SEC. Advisers to hedge funds, private equity funds and other private funds that were previously 
exempt from SEC registration were recently required to register for the first time. Advisers located 
outside the United States may also be required to register with the SEC depending on the extent 
of their U.S. client base and assets under management."). 
27 See Lawrence S. Schaner and Thomas G. Appleman, The Rise Of 3rd-Party Litigation Funding, 
LAW360, Jan. 21, 2011, 
http://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/130/original/The_Rise_Of_3rd-
Party_Litigation_Funding.pdf?1312815913.  
28 See, e.g., 124 Stat. 1376 §§ 941-46 (section of the Dodd-Frank Act titled "Subtitle D—
Improvements to the Asset-Backed Securitization Process").  
29 See Asset-Backed Securities, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-
frank/assetbackedsecurities.shtml.  
30 See supra notes 18-19. 
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At least one observer of the industry has suggested that litigation funding 
contracts should be classified as derivatives, which are regulated under Dodd-
Frank.31  No courts or legislatures in the United States have expressed a view 
regarding whether litigation funding is a derivative.32  Thus, an example from 
Australia may be instructive.   
In Australia, prior to 2012, it was unclear whether a litigation funding 
agreement would be subject to regulation as a derivative under section 761D of 
the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).33  If applicable, section 761D would require the 
funder to hold a Financial Services License issued by the ASIC and would impose 
requirements on the funder to maintain capital adequacy, manage conflicts of 
interests, make mandatory disclosures, and offer dispute resolution procedures to 
clients.34  However, the ASIC has exempted litigation funders from the 
regulations that would require them to obtain a Financial Services License, and 
IMF (Australia) Limited is the only funder in Australia that holds a Financial 
Services License, as well as the only publicly-traded funder in Australia.35 
In 2012, the High Court of Australia in International Litigation Partners Pte 
Ltd. v. Chameleon Mining NL addressed the issue of whether a litigation funding 
agreement is a financial product and whether to require litigation funders to 
obtain a Financial Services License from the ASIC.36  Two justices of the lower 
Court of Appeals had held that the funding agreement was not a derivative, while 
one justice held that it was a derivative.37  All three justices had different reasons 
                                                
31 See, e.g., Robert W. Wood, Perspective: Litigation funding increasingly popular, but what about taxes?, LOS 
ANGELES DAILY JOURNAL, Jun. 11, 2013, 4 (“As if all this was not complex enough, some 
litigation funding arrangements may even qualify as derivative contracts, also called notional 
principal contracts. They call for one or more fixed payments from the funding source, and one or 
more contingent payments from you depending on the outcome of the case.”); Derivatives, U.S. 
SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/derivatives.shtml.  
32 The seven states that have statutes about litigation funding are silent with respect to whether to 
classify the litigation funding agreement as a financial product or security.  See supra note 19. 
33 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), § 761D (defining a derivative under Australian law), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172/s761d.html.  
34 See generally AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES & INVESTMENTS COMMISSION (ASIC), Do you need an AFS 
license?, 
http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/ASIC.NSF/byHeadline/Do%20you%20need%20an%20AFS%20lic
ence%3F (describing what types of businesses must have an Australian Financial Services [AFS] 
license and indicating that some of those businesses may be exempt from the requirement to hold 
an AFS license under certain circumstances). 
35 See Wayne Attrill, Ethical Issues in Litigation Funding, Nov. 12, 2008, 9 n.31, 
http://www.claimsfunding.eu/fileadmin/Documents/Ethical_Issues_Paper.pdf. 
36 See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 5, at 83-86 (describing the Court of Appeals decision 
that was appealed to the High Court). 
37 See Australia: Has the long-anticipated regulation of litigation funding finally arrived?, SWAAB ATTORNEYS, 
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for their conclusions.38  On appeal, the High Court of Australia classified the 
litigation funding agreement as a “credit facility,” but not a “financial product,” 
and held that funders were not required to obtain Financial Services Licenses.39  
The High Court stated that “a contract, arrangement or understanding that is any 
form of financial accommodation is ‘credit,’ and its provision ‘for any period’ will 
be a ‘credit facility,’” even if the funder is paying the lawyers directly and not the 
client.40  The High Court declined to address the definition of “derivative” 
beyond saying that a litigation funding agreement is not a derivative because it is 
“‘a contract for the future provisions of services.’”41  Notably, however, the 
Financial Services License that the ASIC issued to IMF in 2005 refers to litigation 
funding agreements as “derivatives.”42  Furthermore, in direct response to the 
High Court’s Decision, in 2013, the Australian Parliament passed an amendment 
to the Corporations Act that unequivocally states that an interest in a litigation 
funding scheme or litigation funding arrangement is a financial product, not a 
credit facility.43 
Australia’s example suggests that the United States should at least 
consider treating litigation funding contracts themselves as financial products and, 
perhaps, as derivatives.  In addition, at least two scholars have suggested that 
consumer litigation funding44 might be a “consumer finance product” that may 
                                                                                                                           
Jun. 21, 2011,  
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/135958/Corporate+Governance/Has+the+longantici
pated+regulation+of+litigation+funding+finally+arrived.  
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Int’l Litig. Partners Pte Ltd. v Chameleon Mining NL (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (2012) 246 
CLR 455, ¶ 26, http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/download.cgi/au/cases/cth/HCA/2012/45. 
(emphasis in original).  
41 Int’l Litig. Partners v Chameleon, supra note 40, at ¶ 20; Minter Ellison Lawyers, Litigation funding 
decision may bring regulatory treatment of numerous financial instruments into doubt (Oct. 17, 2012), 
http://www.minterellison.com/publications/litigation-funding-decision-for-chameleon-mining/; 
ALLENS/LINKLATERS, Focus:  Litigation Funding Hits Another Speed Hump (Apr. 20, 2011), 
http://www.allens.com.au/pubs/ldr/foldrapr11.htm; Clayton Utz, Litigation funding survives a legal 
challenge in the High Court (Oct. 8, 2012), 
http://www.claytonutz.com/publications/news/201210/08/litigation_funding_survives_a_legal_
challenge_in_the_high_court.page.  
42 ALLENS/LINKLATERS, supra note 41. 
43 King & Wood Mallesons, The High Court finds that litigation funding agreements are not “financial 
products,” (2012), http://www.mallesons.com/publications/marketAlerts/2012/class-actions-Q4-
2012/Pages/The-High-Court-finds-that-litigation-funding-agreements-are-not-financial-
products.aspx.  
44 See supra note 25. 
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fall under the jurisdiction of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).45  
One scholar has suggested that Dodd-Frank should be amended to include 
litigation funding expressly.46 
One of the major obstacles to the applicability of Dodd-Frank to 
litigation funding is that the portfolios of most litigation funders are not large 
enough for them to be “larger participants” under Dodd-Frank and the CFPB’s 
definition.47  Yet, with billions of dollars spent on lawyers and litigation each year, 
future securitization of litigation funding contracts could change the dynamic by 
magnifying the participation of funders enough to transform them into “large 
participants” at that time.48  In the interim, one advantage of at least some 
oversight through Dodd-Frank, the CFPB, or both is to offer some baseline 
regulatory uniformity to the states, whose current regulatory landscape is 
haphazard, conflicting, and inadequate to address the most crucial aspects of 
litigation funding.49 
This article highlights one perspective from the most advanced litigation 
funding market in the world – Australia – and hypothesizes that, depending on 
the structure of a litigation funding agreement in the United States, it might be a 
                                                
45 See Susan L. Martin, Remarks at the Alternative Litigation Funding Conference, GEORGE 
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL (May 2, 2012) 4, available at 
http://www.law.gwu.edu/News/20112012events/Documents/MartinSubmission.pdf. (“Fourth, 
the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau should also regulate deceptive practices of litigation 
funders. Dodd Frank contemplates cooperation between the CFPB and state regulators, and 
litigation funding would be an area that clearly lends itself to that kind of cooperation. The CFPB 
has indicated that one of its goals is to better protect consumers by expanding supervision to 
nonbank companies. However, it noted that its nonbank supervision program will be able to look 
at companies of all sizes in the mortgage, payday lending, and private student lending markets. But 
for all other markets—like consumer installment loans, money transmitting, and debt collection—
the CFPB generally can supervise only larger participants. It is important that Dodd-Frank be 
amended to include consumer litigation funders in the first group because, under most definitions, 
most of these funders could not be considered large participants.”); Richard Painter, The Model 
Contract and the Securities Laws, Part 1, A MODEL LITIGATION FINANCE CONTRACT (July 13, 2013), 
http://litigationfinancecontract.com/the-model-contract-and-the-securities-laws-part-1/ 
(“…Litigation Proceed Rights, if used to help individual litigants cover litigation costs and other 
expenses, could be deemed a consumer finance product subject to disclosure and other 
requirements under federal law, as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, and relevant state 
law.  It may be advisable for this reason to avoid a contract structure that could be characterized 
as a ‘loan’ or ‘financing arrangement’ vis a vis the litigant.”).  
46 See Martin, supra note 45. 
47 Id. 
48 See supra note 1. 
49 See generally Victoria Shannon, Harmonizing Third-Party Litigation Funding Regulation, 36 CARDOZO 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (proposing a categorized approach to harmonizing existing and future 
regulations regarding the transactional, procedural, and ethical aspects of third-party litigation 
funding), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2419686.  
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variety of derivative, albeit perhaps a new type.  If there can be derivatives based 
on the weather, then there probably can be derivatives based on the outcome of 
litigation.50  In addition, future bundling and sales of those litigation funding 
agreements may be a variety of asset-backed security.  Both types of investments 
would likely fall within the purview of the Dodd Franck Act, depending on the 
corporate structure and characteristics of the litigation funder itself.51  Further 
academic inquiry is needed to define the various structures of litigation funding 
arrangements and litigation funders themselves in order to inform regulators 
regarding what type of transactions they are seeking to regulate.52 
 
                                                
50 See Felix Carabello, Introduction to Weather Derivatives, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/optioninvestor/05/052505.asp (last visited Oct. 11, 2014). 
51 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
52 Scholars are already exploring the structure of third-party litigation funding transactions.  See, 
e.g., Maya Steinitz, Incorporating Legal Claims, NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2423541; Maya Steinitz & Abigail C. Field, 
A Model Litigation Finance Contract, 99 IOWA L. REV. 711 (2014); Maya Steinitz, How Much is that 
Lawsuit in the Window? Pricing Legal Claims, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1889 (2013); Maya Steinitz, The 
Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455 (2012); see also Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Legal 
Claims As Private Property: Implications for Eminent Domain, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373 (2009); 
Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities: Securities Regulation, Derivatives 
Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 375 (2005); Adam F. Scales, 
Against Settlement Factoring? The Market in Tort Claims Has Arrived, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 859 (2002). 
